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Abstract: We introduce and study a compromise value for non-transferable
utility games: the Chi-compromise value. It is closely related to the Compro-
mise value introduced by Borm, Keiding, McLean, Oortwijn, and Tijs (1992)
and to the MC-value introduced by Otten, Borm, Peleg, and Tijs (1998).
The main dierence being that the maximal aspiration a player may have in
the game is his maximal (among all coalitions) marginal contribution. We
show that it is well dened on the class of essential and non-level games.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to introduce a new compromise value for non-
transferable utility games (NTU-games): the Chi-compromise value. As with
all compromise values it chooses as the solution of the game the eÆcient vec-
tor lying in the segment between the vectors of maximal and minimal utilities
that each player may expect to obtain; that is, it is a compromise between
their maximum and minimum aspirations. For pure bargaining problems
(that is, situations where all agreements have to be unanimous) the Kalai-
Smorodinsky solution (Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975)) is based on a com-
promise of this type. When partial agreements are possible and utility is
transferable across players (that is, TU-games) we dened (Berganti~nos and
Masso (1996)) a compromise value called the Chi-value. Our proposal here
extends these two particular solutions to general problems where players may
reach partial agreements and utility is not necessarily transferable (that is,
NTU-games).
We propose as the maximum aspiration for a player in a game his maximal
(among all coalitions) marginal contribution and as the minimum aspiration
the maximum remainder he can obtain by going with a coalition of players
and oering them their maximum aspirations. In non-level NTU-games our
proposed vectors of aspirations have the following three properties: (1) Giv-
ing players their maximum aspirations will always exhaust all possible gains
from cooperation. (2) The vector of maximum aspirations is component-wise
larger than the vector of minimal aspirations. (3) The minimum aspiration
obtained in this rather indirect way coincides with the vector of individually
rational payos. We nd this last property interesting because it means that
we have as a result that the minimum aspiration for each player in a game
coincides with what they can obtain without any cooperation. It seems to us
that this property may also be a good indication that the proposed maximum
aspiration is meaningful.
The paper is organized as follows. After a preliminary section which gives
the main notation and concepts comes Section 3. This contains the deni-
tion of the Chi-compromise value; Propositions 1, 2, and 3 which establish
that properties (1), (2), and (3) above hold for non-level NTU-games; the
demonstration that the Chi-compromise value exists for all non-level and es-
sential NTU-games; and nally, a number of examples which illustrate the
concept. Section 4 provides two characterizations of the Chi-compromise
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value using the following axioms: Pareto optimality, covariance, symmetry,
and restricted monotonicity (or strong symmetry instead of symmetry and
restricted monotonicity). Section 5 proposes a dierent compromise value
based on applying our Chi-value for TU-games to the characteristic func-
tion obtained by the classical  transfer approach. Section 6 concludes
by suggesting (as a generalization of Moulin (1984)'s implementation of the
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for pure bargaining problems) a non-cooperative
extensive form game whose subgame perfect equilibrium payos coincide with
the Chi-compromise value. We also compare, briey, our value with other
well-known NTU-values.
2 Preliminaries
Players are the elements of a nite set N = f1; :::; ng where n  2. A non-
empty subset of players is called a coalition . We denote by s the number of
players of coalition S and, abusing notation, by i the set fig.
A (cooperative) game with non-transferable utility (NTU-game) is an or-
dered pair (N; V ) where N = f1; :::; ng is the set of players and V is a
mapping, called the characteristic function, which assigns to each non-empty
coalition S a non-empty subset of IR
s
. The set V (S) is interpreted as the
collection of payos or utilities that members of S can reach by cooperating
among themselves. We will concentrate only on games with non-transferable
utility having the standard properties that for each coalition S, the set V (S)
is closed, non-empty, and comprehensive (i.e., x 2 V (S) and y  x imply
y 2 V (S)).
1
Also, the set V (S) \ IR
s
+
is bounded and non-empty (where
IR
s
+
= fx 2 IR
s
j x  0g). This last requirement is a payo normalization
and it implies that 0 2 V (S) for each coalition. For each player i 2 N
there exists a payo w
i
 0, called the individually rational payo, such
that V (i) = fx 2 IR j x  w
i
g. We denote by V
n
the class of games with
non-transferable utility with n players.
We will often use the following properties of games with non-transferable
utility.
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Given x; y 2 IR
k
, y  x means y
i
 x
i
for all i = 1; :::; k while y < x means y
i
< x
i
for all i = 1; :::; k. Given x 2 IR
n
and a coalition S, denote by x
S
the restriction of x to
the coordinates corresponding to the members of S; i.e., x
S
= (x
i
)
i2S
.
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Denition 1. A game (N; V ) is non-level if for each coalition S we have
that for all x; y 2 V (S) \ IR
s
+
such that y  x  w
S
and x 6= y there exists
z 2 V (S) with the property that z > x.
Denition 2. A game (N; V ) is essential if w 2 V (N).
We denote by C
n
the subclass of non-level and essential games with non-
transferable utility.
A solution on a subclass of games G
n
 V
n
is a function ' :G
n
! IR
n
which assigns a vector ' (N; V ) 2 V (N) to each (N; V ) 2G
n
.
We will consider, and use as references, two special subclasses of games.
A game (N; V ) has transferable utility if there is a real-valued function v
such that V (S) =

x 2 IR
s
j
P
i2S
x
i
 v (S)
	
; namely, each coalition S can
achieve a maximum level of utility v (S) which can be distributed amongst
its members in all possible ways. We denote by v
n
the subclass of games with
transferable utility with n players. A generic game with transferable utility
will be denoted by (N; v). A game (N; V ) is a bargaining game if w 2 V (N)
and V (S) = fx 2 IR
s
j x  w
S
g for every coalition S 6= N ; namely, gains
from cooperation come only from unanimous agreements. We denote by B
n
the subclass of bargaining games with n players. A generic bargaining game
will be denoted by (w;B), where B stands for the set V (N) and w represents
the disagreement point.
We are specially interested in extending two compromise solutions of these
subclasses to games with non-transferable utility. The rst one is the Kalai-
Smorodinsky solution (Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975)) on bargaining games
which represents an eÆcient compromise between the maximal aspiration of
each player, compatible with individual rationality of the others, and the dis-
agreement point. Formally, given (w;B) 2 B
n
dene the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution, denoted by KS (w;B), as follows: for all i 2 N
KS
i
(w;B) = M
KS
i
(w;B) + (1  )w
i
;
where M
KS
i
(w;B) = max

x
i
2 IR j
 
x
i
; x
Nni

2 B and
 
x
i
; x
Nni

 w
	
and
 2 [0; 1] is such that KS (w;B) 2 P (B), where P (B) denotes the Pareto
frontier of B.
2
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In general, given a set A  IR
k
, the Pareto frontier of A is the set P (A) =
fx 2 Aj@y 2 A with the property that y  x; y 6= xg and the weak Pareto frontier of A
is the set WP (A) = fx 2 Aj@y 2 A with the property that y > xg. Given a set A and
a vector y we say that y is undominated for A if @x 2 A such that x  y and x 6= y.
Obviously, if y 2 V (S) n P (V (S)) then y is dominated for V (S).
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The second one is the -value (Berganti~nos and Masso (1996)) on the
subclass of games with transferable utility. It is also based on selecting an
eÆcient compromise between maximal and minimal aspirations of players.
In this case, the maximal aspiration of a player is his largest marginal con-
tribution while his minimal aspiration is the largest remainder he can obtain
after conceding to the other players their maximal aspiration. Formally, let
(N; v) be a game with transferable utility. For each i 2 N , dene player i's
maximum aspiration in the game as
M

i
(N; v) = max
SN;i2S
fv (S)  v (S n i)g :
Given the vector M

(N; v) dene player i's minimum aspiration in the game
as
m

i
(N; v) = max
SN;i2S
8
<
:
v (S) 
X
j2Sni
M

j
(N; v)
9
=
;
:
Dene the -value on v
n
, denoted by  (N; v), as the unique eÆcient vector
in the lineal segment having as extreme points m

(N; v) andM

(N; v); that
is,
 (N; v) = M

(N; v) + (1  )m

(N; v) ;
where  2 [0; 1] is such that
P
i2N

i
(N; v) = v (N). Berganti~nos and Masso
(1996) showed that the -value exists in the class of essential games.
3 The Chi-compromise value
In this section we dene and study a compromise value for NTU-games. Let
(N; V ) be a game inV
n
. For each i 2 N dene player i's maximum aspiration
in the game as
M

i
(N; V ) = max
SN;i2S

t 2 IR j (t; x) 2 V (S) \ IR
s
+
; x 2 P (V (S n i))
	
:
Notice that M

i
(N; V )  w
i
(take S = fig and t = w
i
). We also have
that M

i
(N; V ) < +1 because V (S) \ IR
s
+
is compact and P (V (S n i)) is
closed. Therefore, M

i
(N; V ) is well dened for all (N; V ) in V
n
.
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Given the vector M

(N; V ) dene player i's minimal aspiration in the
game as
m

i
(N; V ) = max
SN;i2S
n
t 2 IR j

t;M

Sni
(N; V )

2 V (S)
o
:
Of course m

i
(N; V )  w
i
(again take S = fig and t = w
i
). Notice that
for each S containing i, the projection of V (S) on i's coordinate is closed
and bounded above. Therefore the maximum dening m

i
(N; V ) does exist
for all (N; V ) in V
n
.
From now on, and when this does not lead to confusion, we will omit the
reference to the game (N; V ) to denote the aspiration vectors m

and M

.
The following propositions state that the three important properties of
the vectors of aspirations already explained in the Introduction hold for non-
level games. Proposition 1 says that, for every coalition S, the vector of
maximum aspirations is undominated for V (S).
Proposition 1. Let (N; V ) be a non-level NTU-game. Then, for all S  N
we have that
M

S
=2 V (S) n P (V (S)):
Proof: If S has only one player the result holds. Suppose it is true when S
has at most p  1 players; we will show that the statement holds in the case
of coalitions with p players.
In order to get a contradiction assume that S has p players and M

S
2
V (S) n P (V (S)). Then, there exists y
S
2 V (S) such that y
S
 M

S
and
i 2 S with y
i
> M

i
. As M

Sni
=2 V (S n i) n P (V (S n i)) (by the induction
hypothesis) and (N; V ) is non-level we can nd x
Sni
2 P (V (S n i)) such that
x
Sni
 M

Sni
. Then, by comprehensiveness,
 
y
i
; x
Sni

2 V (S) and therefore
M

i
 y
i
> M

i
.
Proposition 2 says that for non-level games the maximum aspiration is
larger or equal to the minimum aspiration.
Proposition 2. Let (N; V ) be a non-level NTU-game. Then,
m

M

:
Proof: Let i 2 N be an arbitrary player and let t 2 IR be such that there
exists a coalition S  N containing i such that

t;M

Sni

2 V (S). Since
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w  m

and w  M

we may restrict attention only to t's such that 0 
w
i
 t. By Proposition 1 we must be able to nd x 2 P (V (S n i)) such that
0  x M

Sni
. Therefore, by comprehensiveness of the game,
(t; x) 

t;M

Sni

2 V (S) :
Then, we have (t; x) 2 V (S) \ IR
s
+
. Hence,
m

i
= max
SN;i2S
n
t 2 IR j

t;M

Sni

2 V (S)
o
 max
SN;i2S

t 2 IR j (t; x) 2 V (S) \ IR
s
+
and x 2 P (V (S n i))
	
= M

i
:
Proposition 3 below shows that, for non-level NTU-games, the vector of
minimal aspirations coincides, as it should, with the vector of individually
rational payos. But, again, notice that m

is obtained endogenously as
the maximum reminder after giving to other players in the coalition their
maximal aspirations. We interpret this property as an indication that our
denition of maximal aspiration is sensible.
Proposition 3. Let (N; V ) be a non-level NTU-game. Then,
m

= w:
Proof: From the denition of m

i
it follows that m

i
 w
i
just by taking
S = fig. To see that m

i
 w
i
it will be suÆcient to show that t  w
i
for all
t 2 IR and all S  N such that i 2 S and

t;M

Sni

2 V (S). The proof is
by induction on the number of players in the coalition S.
Assume that S = fi; jg. If
 
t;M

j

2 V (fi; jg) and t > w
i
then, by
comprehensiveness of the game,
 
x;M

j

2 V (fi; jg) \ IR
2
+
for all x  t,
which is impossible by non-levelness of the game and the denition of M

j
.
Assuming that the result is true if S contains p  2 players (the induction
hypothesis), we will show that it is true for all coalitions with p+ 1 players.
Let S = fi
1
; :::; i
p
; ig be any set with p + 1 players containing i and assume
that

t;M

Sni

2 V (S) \ IR
s
+
. If the following implication is true
h
t;M

Sni

2 V (S)
i
)
h
t;M

i
1
; :::;M

i
p 1

2 V (S n i
p
)
i
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then, t  w
i
would follow by the induction hypothesis. Therefore, to get
a contradiction, assume that

t;M

i
1
; :::;M

i
p 1

=2 V (S n i
p
). Then, there
exists a vector x 2 P (V (S n i
p
)) such that x <

t;M

i
1
; :::;M

i
p 1

. There-
fore,

x;M

i
p



t;M

Sni

2 V (S) implying, by non-levelness of the game,
that we can nd a vector y 2 V (S) with the property that y >

x;M

i
p

.
Therefore, y
i
p
> M

i
p
which contradicts the denition of M

i
p
.
Example 1 below shows that the conclusion of Proposition 3 does not
hold for level NTU-games.
Example 1. Let (N; V ) be the NTU-game where N = f1; 2g, w
1
= w
2
= 0,
and V (N) = comp (conv (f(1; 1) ; (2; 0)g)).
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The vector of maximum as-
pirations is M

(N; V ) = (2; 1) and the vector of minimum aspirations is
m

(N; V ) = (1; 0) which for player 1 is strictly larger than w
1
= 0.
We can now dene the Chi-compromise value for NTU-games as well as
state the most important result of the paper which identies a large class
of games (non-level and essential) in which the Chi-compromise value does
exist.
Denition 3. The Chi-compromise value on V
n
, denoted by  (N; V ),
is the unique eÆcient vector in the lineal segment having as extreme points
m

(N; V ) and M

(N; V ); that is,
 (N; V ) = M

(N; V ) + (1  )m

(N; V ) ;
where  2 [0; 1] is such that  (N; V ) 2 P (V (N)).
Theorem 1. For all (N; V ) 2C
n
there exists  (N; V ).
Proof: It follows by combining Propositions 1, 2, and 3 and the essentiality
of the game.
Remark 1. It is straightforward to show that the Chi-compromise value
coincides with the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in bargaining problems and
with the -value in TU-games.
3
In general, if A  IR
n
, comp(A) denotes the comprehensive hull of A (i.e., the smallest
comprehensive set containing A) and conv(A) the convex hull of A.
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Now, we compare more specically our value with two prominent com-
promise values in the literature: the Compromise value of Borm et al. (1992)
and the MC-value of Otten et al. (1998).
Given an NTU-game (N; V ), the Compromise value is dened as the
unique vector on the lineal segment betweenM
C
(N; V ) andm
C
(N; V ) which
lies in V (N) and is closest to M
C
(N; V ), where for any i 2 N
M
C
i
(N; V ) = sup

t 2 IR j
(t; x) 2 V (N) ; x =2 V (Nni) nWP (V (Nni)) ;
and x  w
Nni

and
m
C
i
(N; V ) = max
SN;i2S

t 2 IR j
9x 2 IR
s 1
; (t; x) 2 V (S) ;
and x > M
C
Sni
(N; V )

:
The Compromise value exists for the class of compromise admissible NTU-
games, dened as,
CA
n
=

(N; V ) 2 V
n
j
m
C
(N; V ) M
C
(N; V ) ; m
C
(N; V ) 2 V (N) ;
and M
C
(N; V ) =2 V (N) nWP (V (N))

:
Borm et al. (1992) proved that for any (N; V ) 2V
n
and any i 2 N ,
m
C
i
(N; V )  w
i
. Suppose that (N; V ) is non-level and hence P (V (S)) =
WP (V (S)) for all S  N . Then, m
C
i
(N; V )  m

i
(N; V ). If (t; x) 2 V (N),
x =2 V (Nni) nWP (V (Nni)), and x  w
Nni
, by non-levelness, we can nd
x
0
2 P (V (Nni)) such that x
0
 x and hence (t; x
0
) 2 V (N) \ IR
n 1
+
. Now,
it is easy to conclude that M
C
i
(N; V )  M

i
(N; V ). Then, in the class of
non-level NTU-games, CA
n
C
n
; that is, if the Compromise value exists
then the Chi-compromise value also exists.
Note that if in the denition of M

i
we change x 2 P (V (Sni)) to x 2
WP (V (Sni)) (denote this alternative maximum aspiration by M

i
) then it
is straightforward to check thatM

i
(N; V )  M
C
i
(N; V ) for all NTU-games.
Therefore, the corresponding Chi-compromise value using the M

vector
as maximum aspirations is dened whenever the Compromise value exists.
However, it seems to us that it is more appropriate to obtain the maximum
aspiration of a player i in a coalition S as the remainder assuming that the
members of coalition Sni exhaust all their possible gains of cooperation by
reaching Pareto (and not weakly Pareto) agreements.
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The MC-value of Otten et al. (1998) is dened as the eÆcient outcome
lying on the lineal segment between the vector of individually rational payos
and a vector of maximum aspiration obtained by giving to each player the
sum of all his marginal contributions in all possible orderings of the set of
players. Since in many cases each component of this upper value vector may
be unfeasible it seems diÆcult to justify it as a vector of maximal aspirations.
Otten et al. (1998) showed that the MC-value is well dened in the class of
monotonic, zero-normalized NTU-games, which is unrelated to the class of
non-level and essential NTU-games.
We end this section by calculating the Chi-compromise value in three
well-known examples of NTU-games and comparing it with other proposed
values.
Example 2 (Roth, 1980). Let (N; V ) be a NTU-game such that N =
f1; 2; 3g,
V (fig) = fx
i
2 IR j x
i
 0g; for i 2 N;
V (f1; 2g) = f(x
1
; x
2
) 2 IR
2
j (x
1
; x
2
)  (0:5; 0:5)g;
V (f1; 3g) = f(x
1
; x
3
) 2 IR
2
j (x
1
; x
3
)  (0:25; 0:75)g;
V (f2; 3g) = f(x
2
; x
3
) 2 IR
2
j (x
2
; x
3
)  (0:25; 0:75)g;
and
V (N) = fx 2 IR
3
j 9y 2 convf(0:5; 0:5; 0) ; (0:25; 0; 0:75) ; (0; 0:25; 0:75)g; x  yg:
For this example the Shapley-NTU value (Aumann (1985)) is (0:333; 0:333; 0:333),
the Harsanyi-NTU value (Harsanyi (1963)) is (0:416; 0:416; 0:166), the Con-
sistent value (Maschler and Owen (1989, 1992)) is (0:25; 0:25; 0:5), the MC-
value coincides with the Shapley-NTU value, and the Compromise value is
(0:5; 0:5; 0).
Although the game does not satisfy non-levelness we can compute the
Chi-compromise value, which coincides with (0:5; 0:5; 0), the unique Core
outcome.
Example 3 (Shafer, 1980).
4
Consider the following exchange economy with
three agents and two commodities. The initial commodity bundles of agents
4
We present the modication of Shafer (1980)'s example as it was used in Hart and
Kurz (1983).
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1, 2, and 3 are
!
1
= (1  ; 0); !
2
= (0; 1  ); and !
3
= (; );
where 0   
1
5
, and their respective utility functions, u
i
: IR
2
+
! IR, are
given by
u
1
(y; z) = u
2
(y; z) = minfy; zg; and u
3
(y; z) =
1
2
(y + z):
Following Shapley and Shubik (1969) the corresponding NTU-game (N; V )
is given by:
V (fig) = fx
i
2 IR j x
i
 0g; for i = 1; 2;
V (f3g) = fx
3
2 IR j x
3
 g;
V (f1; 2g) =

(x
1
; x
2
) 2 IR
2
j (x
1
; x
2
)  (1  ; 1  ); x
1
+ x
2
 1  
	
;
V (f1; 3g) =

(x
1
; x
3
) 2 IR
2
j (x
1
; x
3
) 

;
1 + 
2

; x
1
+ x
3

1 + 
2

;
V (f2; 3g) =

(x
2
; x
3
) 2 IR
2
j (x
2
; x
3
) 

;
1 + 
2

; x
2
+ x
3

1 + 
2

;
and
V (N) = fx 2 IR
3
j (x
1
; x
2
; x
3
)  (1; 1; 1); x
1
+ x
2
+ x
3
 1g:
In this game the Shapley-NTU value is (
5 5
12
;
5 5
12
;
1+5
6
), the Harsanyi-
NTU value is (
3 5
6
;
3 5
6
;
5
3
), the MC-value coincides with the Shapley-NTU
value, and the Compromise value is (
1 
2
;
1 
2
; ).
The Chi-compromise value is (
2 2
5 5
;
2 2
5 5
;
1 
5 5
).
Example 4 (Owen, 1972). Let (N; V ) be an NTU-game such that N =
f1; 2; 3g;
V (fig) = fx
i
2 IR j x
i
 0g; for i 2 N;
V (f1; 2g) = f(x
1
; x
2
) 2 IR
2
j x
1
+ 4x
2
 100; x
1
 100; x
2
 25g;
V (f1; 3g) = f(x
1
; x
3
) 2 IR
2
j x
1
 0; x
3
 0g;
V (f2; 3g) = f(x
2
; x
3
) 2 IR
2
j x
2
 0; x
3
 0g;
and
V (N) = fx 2 IR
3
j
X
i2N
x
i
 100; 8i 2 N; x
i
 100; 8i; j 2 N; x
i
+ x
j
 100g:
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In this example the Shapley-NTU value is (50; 50; 0), the Harsanyi-NTU
value is (40; 40; 20), the Consistent value is (50; 37:5; 12:5), the MC-value is
(50; 33:33; 16:67), and the Compromise value is (36:36; 36:36; 27:27).
The Chi{compromise value is (36:36; 36:36; 27:27).
4 Characterizations of the Chi-compromise
value
In this section we study several properties of the Chi-compromise value.
Moreover two characterizations of this value are provided.
Proposition 4. The Chi-compromise value satises the following properties:
Pareto optimality. (N; V ) 2 P (V (N)) for all (N; V ) 2C
n
:
Covariance. Given (N; V ); (N;W ) 2C
n
such that for all S  N ,
W (S) = 
S
 V (S) + 
S
(where 
S
 V (S) =

(
i
x
i
)
i2S
j x
S
2 V (S)
	
;  2
IR
n
;  > 0 and  2 IR
n
) we have that (N;W ) =   (N; V ) + :
Symmetry. If i; j 2 N are symmetric players in the game (N; V ) 2C
n
then 
i
(N; V ) = 
j
(N; V ): Players i and j are called symmetric in a game
(N; V ) if for all S  N n fi; jg and all x 2 V (S [ i) there exists y 2 V (S [ j)
dened by y
j
= x
i
and y
S
= x
S
.
Strong symmetry. If w
i
= w
j
and M

i
(N; V ) = M

j
(N; V ) then

i
(N; V ) = 
j
(N; V ).
RestrictedMonotonicity. If (N; V ); (N; V
0
) 2C
n
are such that V (N) 
V
0
(N), w = w
0
, and M

(N; V ) = M

(N; V
0
) then (N; V )  (N; V
0
):
Proof: It is straightforward to check that the Chi-compromise value satises
these ve properties.
Theorem 2. The Chi-compromise value is the unique solution on C
n
satis-
fying Pareto optimality, covariance, symmetry, and restricted monotonicity.
Proof: We have just established in Proposition 4 that the Chi-compromise
value satises the four properties.
Now, we prove uniqueness. Suppose F is another solution satisfying the
four properties. By covariance it suÆces to prove that (N; V ) = F (N; V )
when, for all i 2 N , w
i
= 0 and M

i
(N; V ) = 1.
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Clearly, for all i 2 N , the vector c
i
2 IR
n
dened by c
i
j
= 
j
(N; V ) + 
if i = j and c
i
j
= 0 if j 6= i belongs to V (N) for  suÆciently small. The
non-levelness ensures that  is strictly positive. Note that for all i 2 N ,

i
(N; V )  1.
Let (N;W ) be such that for all i 2 N
W (fig) = fx 2 IR j x  0g ;
for all S  N such that 2  s  n  1
W (S) = comp
(
x
S
2 IR
S
j 8i 2 S; 0  x
i
 1; and
X
i2S
x
i
 1
)
;
and
W (N) = comp
 
conv
 
fc
i
2 IR
n
j i 2 Ng [ (N; V )

\ V (N):
Then (N;W ) 2C
n
, M

i
(N;W ) = 1 for all i 2 N , and (N; V ) = (N;W ).
By symmetry for all i; j 2 N , F
i
(N;W ) = F
j
(N;W ). Note that even though
W (N) is not necessarily a symmetric set, (N;W ) is a symmetric game.
Therefore by Pareto optimality, F (N;W ) = (N;W ). By restricted mono-
tonicity F (N;W )  F (N; V ), which implies (N; V )  F (N; V ). But since
 satises Pareto optimality we can conclude that (N; V ) = F (N; V ).
Theorem 3. The Chi-compromise value is the unique solution on C
n
satis-
fying Pareto optimality, covariance, and strong symmetry.
Proof: Proposition 4 establishes that the Chi-compromise value satises these
properties.
Now we prove uniqueness. Suppose F is another solution satisfying these
properties. By covariance it suÆces to prove that (N; V ) = F (N; V ) when,
for all i 2 N , w
i
= 0 and M

i
(N; V ) = 1.
By strong symmetry, for all i; j 2 N; F
i
(N; V ) = F
j
(N; V ) and 
i
(N; V ) =

j
(N; V ). By Pareto optimality, F (N; V ) = (N; V ).
Note that all axioms used in both characterizations are independent. The
egalitarian solution dened by Kalai and Samet (1985) satises all ve prop-
erties except covariance. The solution f
1
dened as f
1
(N; V ) = w for all
(N; V ) 2C
n
satises all properties except Pareto optimality. The solution f
2
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dened as the Shapley value when (N; V ) is an essential TU-game and the
Chi-compromise value in the rest of the class C
n
satises all properties ex-
cept strong symmetry and restricted monotonicity. The solution f
3
dened as
f
3
i
(N; V ) = w
i
for i 6= 1 and f
3
1
(N; V ) = max

t 2 IR j
 
t; w
Nn1

2 V (N)
	
,
satises all properties except symmetry.
These axiomatic characterizations can be extended in the following way.
Theorem 2 is also true for the class of NTU-games for which the Chi-
compromise value exists and the condition of non-levelness is satised only
for the set V (N) \ IR
n
+
. Theorem 3 is also true for the class of NTU-games
where the Chi-compromise value exists.
Moreover, notice that in both characterizations the sets V (S) need not
be convex. While this is also possible in the characterization of the MC-value
it is not the case in the characterization of the Compromise value where the
set V (N) has to be convex.
5 The Lambda-transfer Chi-value
Shapley (1969) dened the family of -transfer TU-games corresponding to
an NTU-game. Using this family of games, and their corresponding Shapley
values, he dened the NTU-Shapley value. We proceed in the same way
using our -value for TU-games instead of the Shapley value.
Dene 
n
+
=

 2 IR
n
+
j
P
i2N

i
= 1
	
as the n-dimensional unit simplex.
Given a NTU-game (N; V ) we say that the vector  2 
n
+
is feasible if
sup

P
i2S

i
x
i
j x 2 V (S)
	
< 1 for all S  N . For each feasible vector
 2 
n
+
we dene the TU-game
 
N; v


by associating with each coalition
S  N the number v

(S) = sup

P
i2S

i
x
i
j x 2 V (S)
	
:
Denition 4. The Lambda-transfer Chi-value onV
n
, denoted by 

(N; V ),
is the set


(N; V ) =

x 2 V (N) j   x  
 
N; v


for some  2 
n
+
feasible
	
:
Before stating a result establishing suÆcient conditions under which the
Lambda-transfer Chi-value set is non-empty we need to dene two standard
properties of NTU-games.
Denition 5. A NTU-game (N; V ) is compactly generated if for all
S  N there exists a compact set K
S
 IR
s
with the property that V (S) =
13
fx 2 IR
s
j x  yfor some y 2 K
S
g. A NTU-game (N; V ) is convex if for all
S  N the set V (S) is convex.
Theorem 4. Let (N; V ) be an essential, compactly generated, and convex
NTU-game. Then, 

(N; V ) 6= ;.
Proof: First, we will show that if the NTU-game (N; V ) is essential then for
any  2 
n
+
feasible the TU-game
 
N; v


is essential as well. Consider any
i 2 N . By denition v

(i) = 
i
w
i
. Moreover, by the essentiality of (N; V ),
v

(N) = sup
(
X
i2N

i
x
i
j x 2 V (N)
)

X
i2N

i
w
i
=
X
i2N
v

(fig) ,
which means that the TU-game
 
N; v


is essential.
The non-emptiness of the set 

(N; V ) follows using a xed-point argu-
ment similar to that of Shapley (1969).
The game of Example 2 illustrates the fact that, in general, the Chi-
compromise value and the Lambda-transfer Chi-value may be dierent. After
a simple, but very tedious computation, it is possible to see that 

(N; V ) =
(0:33; 0:33; 0:33) while  (N; V ) = (0:5; 0:5; 0) :
6 Concluding remarks
Following the Nash program, there is a long tradition of justifying axiomatic
bargaining solutions by means of equilibria of a non-cooperative game associ-
ated to the original bargaining problem. Moulin (1984) exhibits an extensive-
form game whose subgame perfect equilibria induce the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution. Here, and following the procedure used by Hart and Mas-Colell
(1996) to obtain the Consistent value by extending the non-cooperative im-
plementation of the Nash bargaining solution (which also coincides with the
Shapley value for TU-games) to NTU-games, we extend Moulin's implemen-
tation of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for bargaining problems to NTU-
games as follows:
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 Round 0. Each player i makes a bid p
i
where 0 < p
i
 1 and the players
are renumbered in decreasing order of their bids, p
1
 p
2
 :::  p
n
(players with tied bids are ordered randomly among themselves).
 Round 1. Player 1 proposes a payo vector x = (x
1
; :::; x
n
) for the
approval of player n, who can either accept or reject it. If he accepts
it the game proceeds to round 2.
In Moulin's implementation, if player n rejects the initial oer he must
make a counteroer to the rest of the players, who can reject or accept
it. If somebody rejects it the disagreement point is enforced. In our
model player n, who rejected the initial oer, can make a proposal to
some smaller coalition. This modication of Moulin's implementation is
motivated because in NTU-games partial agreements are also possible.
 Rounds 2; :::; n   1 are similar to round 1 but now players n   1; :::; 2
(instead of player n) have to accept or reject the oer of player 1.
By induction on the number of players, it is possible to show that the
associated payos of all subgame-perfect equilibria of this extensive form
coincide with the Chi-compromise value of the NTU-game.
Before nishing this paper we would like to briey compare our proposal
with other NTU-values. As with all compromise values it is easier to com-
pute than the Shapley, Harsanyi, and the Consistent values. However, the
Shapley and Harsanyi values have nice characterizations, while those of all
compromise values including ours are ad hoc (in the sense that the vectors
of maximum and minimum aspirations are used in the denitions of some
of the key axioms); on the contrast, to our knowledge the Consistent value
has yet to be fully characterized (Maschler and Owen (1989) characterize it
for the class of hyperplane games). Except for the Compromise value, whose
existence is guaranteed only for games with non-empty cores (a proper sub-
class of compromise admissible NTU-games), the existence of all other NTU-
values is guaranteed for classes of games which are relatively larger than this
and unrelated to each other. Finally, to our knowledge, only the Consistent
value (Hard and Mas-Colell (1996)) and our Chi-compromise value have been
shown to be implementable by extensive-form games.
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